Noboa’s government must now prosecute a war on drugs without additional powers
‘The government tried to manipulate the Ecuadorian people by claiming that the presence of “Rambos,” “Robocops,” and “gringos” would help combat crime. It was political theatre.’
Gary Espinoza, President of the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN – National Confederation of Farmworker, Indigenous, and Black Organizations), is talking about a potential US military base within Ecuador’s borders, which the current constitution prohibits.
President Daniel Noboa told the BBC earlier this year that he wanted foreign ‘armies’ to fight a ‘war’ against the surging crime that gave Ecuador the highest homicide rate in Latin America in 2023.
The government sought approval to change the constitution in a referendum on 16 November 2025. Social leaders like Sr. Espinoza campaigned hard for a ‘No’ vote, despite significant personal risk.
Ecuadorians voted convincingly against all four of the government’s measures, which would have also eliminated funding for political parties, reduced the number of legislative seats, and triggered a complete rewrite of the constitution.
The referendum was rushed, with only 13 days of campaigning and a lack of clarity about what the reforms meant. When asked if the government had a plan for the new constitution, President Noboa responded, ‘Of course, I will reveal it the day we win the referendum.’
For Sr. Espinoza, it was clear why the government lost. ‘People are worried about crime, unemployment, the lack of medicines in hospitals, and the lack of services in rural schools. People understand that none of this requires constitutional reform.’
He stressed that this was not about left-wing or right-wing politics, but rather a minga, or communal effort: ‘I believe it was important that we confronted this referendum as a civic, not partisan, effort. All sectors participated. This [vote] was a victory for the Ecuadorian people.’
Constitutional Consternation
After taking office in 2007, left-wing President Rafael Correa called a referendum that led to a Constituent Assembly, which drafted a new constitution approved by voters in 2008.
The current constitution centres on the principles of ‘Buen Vivir,’ an idea of justice and collective well-being that draws from indigenous worldviews and guarantees the collective rights of indigenous peoples.
It also has many problems. The constitution requires that specific industries be majority-controlled by the state and limits the types of arbitration available for investment and debt disputes.
In the view of José Hidalgo Pallares, Director General of the Corporación de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CORDES – Corporation for Development Studies), the constitution ‘has many points that limit investment,’ a major challenge for a country that runs a large deficit and struggles for economic growth.
On 13 September 2025, President Noboa removed Ecuador’s diesel subsidies, one of the conditions of an IMF deal that provided Ecuador with critical debt relief, which Sr. Hidalgo Pallares believes was secured in part ‘due to influence from the U.S. Treasury.’
In his view, the elimination of this subsidy was ‘important and necessary’ but carried a significant ‘political cost.’
That political cost was a national strike led by Ecuador’s indigenous communities, who have long defended the fuel subsidy as critical to the economic well-being of the country’s poorest.
Noboa responded by accusing protestors of ‘terrorism’ and declaring a state of emergency in several provinces, suspending freedom of assembly and deploying the military to confront activists.
Human Rights Watch reports that soldiers fired tear gas and non-lethal projectiles at low angles at protesters. The government shut down indigenous media outlets and cut power, internet, and phone services at protest sites.
‘NO’ Political Posters found in Quito during the lead-up to the 2025 Referendum. Photo: Oliver Lawson
Tough on Crime, Tough on People
The violence that met those protesters is indicative of this administration’s willingness to use military force as a solution to socio-economic problems.
In January 2024, Noboa declared an ‘internal armed conflict’ against organized crime. The military and police have rarely been out of the headlines, given a succession of operations and major seizures.
The rhetoric of warfare allows the state to treat its citizens worse than combatants. Amnesty International documented 10 cases of forced disappearances across five different operations in the rural areas of Esmeraldas, Los Ríos, and Guayas.
They also report that the police and military made thousands of arrests with ‘little evidence of due process’, with indications of torture and many cases of extrajudicial killings.
Accusing them of funding violence, the government froze the bank accounts of many social leaders in late September 2025, according to Human Rights Watch.
‘They block our bank accounts—our accounts, even though we have nothing to do with organised crime, nothing to do with drug trafficking, nothing to do with money laundering,’ said Sr. Espinoza.
To wage this ‘war on narcoterror,’ Ecuador’s president has needed new powers. In early June 2025, the legislature granted him the ability to pardon police officers and soldiers for conduct committed during operations and to redirect funding towards crime-fighting measures.
But the state appears to be losing. The homicide rate this year is projected to be 47-52 per 100,000, according to the Center for Economic and Policy Research, which would make 2025 the deadliest year on record.
According to Professor Daniel Pontón of the Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN – Institute of Advanced National Studies), ‘The government has had multiple operations, daily blows against crime, but with little ability to translate that into real improvements in security indicators. This policy of “many results, little impact” is the clearest proof that the government lacks a strategy.’
Sr. Espinoza said people in his community still faced the same risks from criminals: ‘In Durán, the problems continue. In Manta, the problems continue. In my province, Esmeraldas, crime continues as before. Extortion continues. Kidnappings continue. Crime has simply changed strategies.’
Political Propaganda in Quito in the lead-up to the Referendum. Photo: Oliver Lawson
Foreign Armies for a War on Crime
Question A in the referendum asked whether foreign militaries should be allowed to maintain bases in Ecuador. The administration raised the idea of re-establishing a US base in the country for the first time since Correa expelled US forces in 2009.
When US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem visited Ecuador in August 2025, Noboa took her to a military base that could have hosted US troops.
Prof. Pontón argues that the military base was never a decisive issue for security because it fails to address a fundamental lack of institutional capacity and sustained underfunding of security apparatus.
‘The U.S. government itself said that bases are not useful – maybe they were 20 or 30 years ago, but now the U.S. has other capabilities.’
The two countries are already cooperating without a physical base: ‘the US can conduct patrols. Not necessarily with a base, but you have planes landing in Manta or other parts of the country’, Prof. Pontón pointed out.
In the words of Sr. Espinoza, ‘U.S. military personnel are not going to control street crime. They are not going into dangerous neighbourhoods. They would sit comfortably on their bases, monitoring things from a distance. They will not patrol the streets.’
For Prof. Daniel Pontón, ‘the issue of the base was used as a political symbol.’
Correa terminated the US base at Manta in 2009. Since then, the idea of the base has been a proxy for deeper debates over sovereignty, militarism and security.
Re-establishing a base, like removing the constitution, would have been another attempt to wipe Correa’s fingerprints from the Ecuadorian state.
Weakened by the defeat, Noboa needs a new strategy.
